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Rural Livelihoods and Poverty Reduction
Strategies in Four African Countries
FRANK ELLIS and H. ADE FREEMAN
This paper compares and contrasts rural livelihoods in Uganda,
Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi, with a view to informing rural poverty
reduction policies within Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans
(PRSPs). Low household incomes in rural areas of all countries
are associated with low land and livestock holdings, high reliance
on food crop agriculture, and low monetisation of the rural
economy. These adverse factors are in some instances made more
difﬁcult by land sub-division at inheritance, declining civil security
in rural areas, deteriorating access to proper agronomic advice and
inputs, and predatory taxation by decentralised district councils.
Better off households are distinguished by virtuous spirals of
accumulation typically involving diverse livestock ownership,
engagement in non-farm self-employment, and diversity of on-farm
and non-farm income sources. Lessons for PRSPs centre on the
creation of a facilitating, rather than blocking, public sector
environment for the multiplication of non-farm enterprises; seeking
creative solutions to the spread of technical advice to farmers; and
examining critically the necessity for, and impact of, tax revenue
collection by district councils on rural incomes and enterprise.
I . INTRODUCTION
This paper summarises the comparative results of research undertaken on
rural livelihoods and poverty reduction in Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and
Malawi.1 The research comprises two main components. The ﬁrst is the
investigation of the micro level circumstances of the rural poor utilising the
sustainable livelihoods framework as a guide to the research methods
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deployed;2 the second is making the micro–macro links between the
experience of rural poverty and the strategic policies designed to tackle its
causes and reduce its incidence. The two preeminent strategic policies
addressed by the research are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
and the decentralisation of government to elected district councils or
assemblies.
There are good reasons for using micro level research as a reality check on
the macro strategic policies currently in vogue. Despite the rhetoric of
participation, empowerment and ownership that infuses the discourse on
PRSPs, these are nevertheless fundamentally rather centralised processes
following blueprints available on World Bank and IMF websites, and
connected to central budget support and public expenditure management
considerations that are to do with improving governance at high government
levels.3 While all PRSPs contain performance indicators and establish
poverty monitoring institutions and instruments, indicators by themselves
rarely result in critical examination of the often complicated relationships of
cause and effect that produce particular outcomes.
Decentralisation represents particular challenges for the effectiveness of
national poverty reduction agendas [Watson, 2002]. While on the face of it
decentralisation is about devolving power to district levels, improving
democracy and participation, and adapting service delivery to local priorities,
decentralisation also creates political and bureaucratic entities that are able to
pass and enforce by-laws and collect taxes in order to contribute to their
budgets and running costs. Most of the literature on decentralisation views
these powers almost entirely from the viewpoint of strengthening nascent
district councils, and improving the revenue ‘yield’ that will enable them to
function with increased autonomy from central government in the future
[Bird, 1990; Manor, 1999]. Yet these powers may result in tax and license
burdens that block and disable wealth generation in rural areas, and
counteract other efforts to reduce rural poverty [Francis and James, 2003].
Livelihoods research can help to bridge the gap between the levers on rural
poverty reduction that the PRSPs set out to strengthen, and the intermediating
role of district councils or assemblies in the poverty reduction process.4 The
‘institutional context’ of rural livelihoods is signiﬁcantly altered, for better or
worse, by decentralisation, and livelihoods precepts can help track the effects
of these changes on the expansion or contraction of opportunities that permit
the poor to build their own pathways out of poverty. The idea of an ‘enabling
environment’ for poverty reduction is often alluded to in poverty documents,
including PRSPs, but little attention is given to what this really means, nor to
the changed behaviours on the part of the public sector, including the
decentralised public sector, that this idea necessitates [Kydd and Dorward,
2001].
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This paper thus utilises a framework that connects factors inhibiting the
achievement of poverty reduction at village and sub-district levels, to revenue
collection and service delivery attributes in decentralised district level local
authorities, and upwards to priorities articulated in PRSPs. A central notion is
that successful poverty reduction may be more to do with creating a local
level public sector institutional environment that actively facilitates the
multiplication of diverse and dynamic economic activities than to do with the
sectoral expenditure targets in areas like education and road building that
tend to preoccupy PRSPs. Institutional constraints and blockages are
identiﬁed by livelihoods research, they reside in the way authority is
interpreted in decentralised institutions, and they are addressed sketchily, if at
all, in PRSPs as they are currently formulated.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sketches out a broad
comparison between the four countries, as a backdrop to the research
ﬁndings, and also provides an overview of the PRSP process across them.
This is followed by a brief description of the research method, and a summary
of comparative village and household level characteristics that emerged from
qualitative and quantitative research. The latter exercise focuses on the asset
status of rural citizens, the income-generating activities in which they engage,
and the institutional environment within which livelihood strategies are
adopted and adapted. A particular institutional feature, the implications for
poverty reduction of rural taxation under ﬁscal decentralisation, is given
special emphasis. The paper concludes by linking the micro level ﬁndings
back to macro level poverty reduction strategies with a view to identifying
gaps in these strategies that need to be addressed if real progress in rural
poverty reduction is to be achieved.
I I . COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW: FOUR COUNTRIES AND THEIR
PRSPS
The four countries under consideration here have distinct political histories
post-independence, yet turn out to have much in common in terms of the
social and economic circumstances that prevail within them at the start of the
twenty-ﬁrst century.5 They are all previous British colonies, and all attained
independence between 1961 and 1964.6 Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were
grouped together as East Africa for a number of administrative and
infrastructural purposes during the colonial era, and this evolved after
independence into the customs union of the East African Community which
disintegrated in the 1970s and was revived a quarter of a century later in the
late 1990s.7 Malawi, formerly Nyasaland, was part of the colonial federation
that included modern day Zimbabwe and Zambia. None of the countries have
yet achieved sustained economic growth for a sufﬁcient duration to lift them
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from the low income and high poverty incidence that have characterised them
for the past forty years; although among them Uganda has been making
notable gains from a low base since the late 1980s.
In the current era, three of the four countries have a constitution allowing
for multi-party democracy and elections every ﬁve years, with elected
presidents only permitted two terms in ofﬁce. Uganda is an exception, with
political competition allowed within the broad-based Movement party that
emerged from civil war in the 1980s, but not between separate parties.8
However, in Uganda too, a constitutional amendment permits the president
only two terms in ofﬁce. In two cases, Kenya and Uganda, incumbent
presidents had already been in power before the two terms rule was
introduced, so that by the end of his period in ofﬁce in December 2002,
president Moi in Kenya had been in power for 24 years, while in Uganda the
continuing presidency of Yoweri Museveni had lasted 17 years as of 2003.
The convergence in political systems across the region is of recent origin,
dating from the mid-1990s. For most of the post-independence period, each
country followed very much its own political trajectory and the ostensible
philosophies pursued differed markedly between them. Under Nyerere,
Tanzania was explicitly socialist in its approach to development, involving
the relocation of the scattered rural population into nuclear villages, state
ownership of enterprises across the sectors, and parastatal control of crop
marketing. Under Kenyatta, then Moi, Kenya pursued an apparently private
enterprise and market-oriented approach to development. Malawi, under
‘President for Life’ Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, differed yet again, with a
bias towards land and wealth accumulation by a small minority, and reliance
on labour migration to South Africa to provide remittance income to the low
income rural customary sector. Until the late 1980s, Uganda had the most
unstable post-independence political history, characterised by volatile
electoral politics in some periods, the dictatorship of Idi Amin, and civil war.9
Past divergencies in political ideas tend to exaggerate true differences in
the interplay of politics and economics in the four countries. In reality, quite a
lot of important things were approached in much the same way everywhere,
for example the marketing of strategic export and food crops was undertaken
in all countries by monopoly marketing boards and parastatals. All countries
have been beset by a central problem of political power and public ofﬁce
coming to represent leverage over private wealth, a problem exacerbated in
the 1980s by steep declines in the real level of public sector salaries.10 The
side effects of the failure to maintain a separation between public ofﬁce and
private income generation are widely apparent: poor discharge of public
functions, demotivation of lower level government employees, declining
delivery of public services including utilities and infrastructure, and a
difﬁcult and unpredictable, even sometimes hostile, public sector disposition
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towards those private sector enterprises not owned or part-owned by
politicians and civil servants.
Some basic current economic and social comparisons between the four
countries are summarised in Table 1. Their per capita income in the year
2000 ranged from US$190 (Malawi) to US$360 (Kenya). Kenya remains, as
it always has been, the best-off country in this region, although the per capita
income gap between Kenya and Uganda is narrowing fast due to zero growth
in this indicator in Kenya compared with a sustained increase of nearly 4 per
cent per year in Uganda. While three of the countries still obtain more than 40
per cent of their GDP from agriculture, in Kenya this proportion has fallen to
20 per cent due to the signiﬁcance of services, tourism and industry in that
economy.
All four countries still have relatively high rates of population growth,
varying between 2.4 (Kenya) and 3.0 (Uganda) per cent during the 1990s,
though this has come down from higher rates that prevailed in the 1970s and
1980s. The share of the population living in rural areas is estimated at around
85 per cent in Malawi and Uganda, and 67 per cent in Tanzania and Kenya.11
TABLE 1
BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS
Category Units Kenya Uganda Tanzania Malawi
Economic data 2000
GNI per capita US$ 360 310 280 170
Rank rank 172 176 184 200
Growth rate 1988–2000 % p.a. 0.0 3.7 0.5 0.6
Agriculture GDP share % 19.9 42.5 45.1 41.6
Population 2000
Total Population million 30.1 22.2 33.7 10.3
Growth rate 1990–2000 % p.a. 2.4 3.0 2.8 2.6
Rural % total 66.6 85.8 67.7 85.3
Urban % total 33.4 14.2 32.3 14.7
Social indicators 2000
HDI index index 0.513 0.444 0.440 0.400
Rank rank 134 150 151 163
Life expectancy years 47.0 42.1 44.4 38.8
Infant mortality per ‘000 77.7 83.0 92.8 102.8
Adult literacy % 82.4 67.1 75.1 60.1
Ofﬁcial aid ﬂows 2000
Total aid US$m 512.3 819.4 1,044.6 445.3
Share of GDP % 4.9 13.3 11.6 26.2
Aid per capita US$ 17.0 36.9 31.0 43.2
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report [2002]; World Bank, World Development
Indicators [2001]; World Bank, African Development Indicators [2002]; UNDP, Human
Development Report [2002].
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The countries fall within a fairly narrow band with respect to human
development indicators, being ranked between 134th (Kenya) and 163rd
(Malawi) amongst countries for which the Human Development Index is
compiled [UNDP, 2002]. Life expectancy at birth, ranging between 39 and 47
years, has been falling in the region due to the impact of the spread of HIV/
AIDS and declining standards of public health in some countries. The high
reliance of three out of the four countries on foreign aid is notable, net aid
ﬂows per capita ranging from US$31 for Tanzania to US$43 for Malawi, and
corresponding to more than a quarter of GDP in Malawi.
Estimates of the prevalence of absolute poverty in the four countries come
from household income and expenditure surveys that are national in scope,
and aim to be representative of the country as a whole (Table 2). Malawi has
by far the greatest proportion of its population living in poverty, with 65 per
cent of the total population estimated to be in poverty, and a poverty
incidence of 67 per cent in rural areas and 55 per cent in urban areas. Kenya,
despite its highest per capita income level in this group of countries, has the
next highest poverty proportions, estimated as 52 per cent overall, 53 per cent
rural, and 49 per cent urban. Tanzania and Uganda display fairly similar
poverty proﬁles according to recent evidence, both with 35 per cent of their
total population designated as poor, 39 per cent poverty incidence in rural
areas in both cases, and between 26 per cent (Tanzania) and 10 per cent
(Uganda) poverty incidence in urban areas.
The differences between the comparative poverty proﬁles of each
country and their comparative per capita GDP levels reﬂect, of course,
income distribution considerations. Uganda and Tanzania have less
unequal income distributions than Kenya or Malawi.12 Poverty trends,
where these are available, are also indicative of the success or failure of
past policies and patterns of economic growth for reducing poverty. For
Uganda, it has been estimated that overall poverty declined from 56 per
cent in 1992 to 44 per cent in 1997 and 35 per cent in 2000 [Appleton,
2001]. This is quite an achievement. The estimated incidence of rural
TABLE 2
POVERTY ESTIMATES IN THE FOUR COUNTRIES
Kenya Uganda Tanzania Malawi
Year 1997 1999–2000 2000–01 1997–98
poverty headcount %
Total 52.3 35.2 35.7 65.3
Rural 52.9 39.1 38.7 66.5
Urban 49.2 10.3 17.6/25.8* 54.9
*The two poverty percentages given here refer to Dar es Salaam on its own, and all other urban
areas, respectively. Sources: Appleton [2001]; Kenya [2001]; Malawi [2000]; Tanzania, [2002].
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poverty fell by 20 percentage points, from 59 per cent to 39 per cent, in
this eight-year period.
For Tanzania, small gains in reducing poverty between 1991/92 and 2000/
01 are estimated, from 39 to 36 per cent of the total population and 41 to 39
per cent of the rural population [Tanzania, 2002]. For Kenya the incidence of
poverty appears to have increased, between 1992 and 1997, from 46 to 52 per
cent of the rural population, and 29 to 49 per cent of the urban population
[World Bank, 1995; Kenya, 2001]. For Malawi, a lack of comparable data
across time periods means that the direction of poverty trends cannot be
veriﬁed. It seems likely, however, from indirect indicators, that poverty
increased during the 1990s.
All four countries considered in this paper have Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or their equivalent. The Uganda PRSP is called the
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). In all countries the ﬁrst moves
towards an integrated approach to poverty occurred during the mid-1990s,13
but it was the establishment of the PRSP framework as part of the Enhanced
Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC), and as a replacement for
structural adjustment lending by the IMF and World Bank that precipitated
the preparation of interim and ﬁnal PRSP documents.14 The publication dates
of ﬁrst round PRSPs were March 2000 (Uganda), October 2000 (Tanzania),
June 2001 (Kenya) and April 2002 (Malawi). Uganda and Tanzania reached
the ‘completion point’ for enhanced HIPC debt relief in May 2000 and
November 2001 respectively, while Malawi achieved ‘decision point’ in
December 2000, and Kenya has yet to start the HIPC sequence.15 A special
feature of the Uganda approach is the so-called Plan for the Modernisation of
Agriculture (PMA), which is closely integrated to the PEAP, and seeks
amongst other things to implement radical change in the delivery of services
to farmers [Uganda, 2000a].
PRSPs contain many strands and themes in common, and are similar, too,
in that some elements of them are elaborated and costed in great detail, while
others fall back on generic statements of intent. Their goals typically include
sustainable growth, macroeconomic stability, good governance, human
capital development, improving the quality of life of the poor, and increasing
the ability of the poor to raise their own incomes, or, as stated in the Malawi
PRSP ‘to create the conditions whereby the poor can reduce their own
poverty’ [Malawi, 2001: 9]. This last objective is among the least well
articulated in all PRSPs. While components such as school building targets,
or safety net supports, are often quite precisely speciﬁed and costed, the
changes in public roles and modes of conduct required in order to facilitate
the poor to construct their own routes out of poverty are barely considered.
It is possible that the poverty reduction approach ushered in by PRSPs
works best for big expenditures on services where targets are relatively
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straightforward to specify, the costs of what is intended can be estimated fairly
accurately, budgets can be tracked, compliance with accounting procedures
can be monitored, and outcomes accurately measured. Education, health and
roads comply in varying degrees with these aspects, exempliﬁed by the
universal primary education target of the millennium development goals. The
elusive ‘enabling environment’ that is required in order to facilitate pro-poor
growth and widen the asset and activity options of the poor is more difﬁcult, as
also is the delivery of ‘soft’ services such as appropriate advice on agricultural
technologies to the rural poor. These do not require the same scale of donor
funding as education or roads, but without progress happening in them, the
outcomes for poverty reduction of the big expenditures may turn out to be a lot
less impressive than is currently hoped. These are the policy considerations to
which this paper returns after looking at the micro level of rural livelihoods
and poverty in the four countries.
I I I . RESEARCH METHODS AND LOCATIONS16
Research on rural livelihoods must make difﬁcult choices, because the
encompassing character of the livelihoods concept means that almost any
aspect of the way people go about gaining a living is potentially legitimate to
investigate. In the event, it was decided to adopt a division of labour between
qualitative, mainly group, investigatory methods and quantitative household
surveys such that the qualitative component addressed the policy and
institutional context of livelihoods and changing livelihood circumstances at
community level, while the quantitative component addressed assets,
activities, incomes, and vulnerability factors at household level. This mixture
of qualitative and quantitative data collection has been gaining credence in
the literature on development research methods [Booth et al., 1998; Kanbur,
2001; White, 2002].
Selection of districts and villages in each country was made on the basis of
the twin criteria of, ﬁrst, representativeness of rural livelihood patterns in a
broad sense, and, second, ability to capture the effect of livelihood ‘gradients’
of various kinds. The key livelihood gradients that determined village
selection were intensive vs extensive farming, small vs large farm size,
variations in rainfall and other agro-ecological conditions, variations in extent
of livestock keeping, proximity or remoteness from public infrastructure and
services, and variations in access to non-farm activities. In addition, in each
country one or more community natural resource management issue was used
as a guide to village selection, for example, ﬁsheries, forestry or farmer-
managed irrigation.
The location of districts and villages studied in the research is shown in
Figure 1. Overall, 1,345 households in 37 villages in nine districts across the
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FIGURE 1
FIELD RESEARCH LOCATIONS 2001–2002
(showing district names and number of villages)
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four countries were researched. Within each village, a PRA wealth-ranking
exercise was conducted, resulting in the identiﬁcation of three wealth groups
that acted as the sampling frame for a stratiﬁed random sample. With a list of
households in each wealth group, ten households were randomly chosen from
each of the well-off and middle categories, and 15 households from the poor
category, resulting in a sample size of 35 households for each village. In
some instances, this procedure was altered in order to create sub-samples
comprising particular categories of village household, for example boat
owners, crew members or migrant ﬁshermen in ﬁshing villages.
The effect of the wealth ranking, aside from the perceptions about poverty
and wealth gained from the exercise itself, was to ensure that the household
sample drawn per village represented the full range of livelihood
circumstances to be found in villages, rather than being accidentally clustered
around the mode of the range. It is important to note that the procedure
described was not designed to make inferences about the larger populations
from which the samples were drawn, whether at village, district or country
levels. The purposive ﬁeldwork selection procedure from districts, to
villages, and to households set out to identify and describe a range of
livelihood patterns that were likely to contain within them the experiences of
a substantial proportion of rural individuals and households in each country.
Statistical analysis undertaken on the resulting dataset refers only to sample
characteristics, and gains its interest from within-sample comparisons of
livelihood indicators across different socio-economic groups, not from a
claim to represent national patterns.
IV. THE ASSET STATUS OF RURAL LIVELIHOODS IN THE FOUR
COUNTRIES
Current understandings of poverty place considerable emphasis on ownership
or access to assets that can be put to productive use as the building blocks by
which the poor can construct their own routes out of poverty [World Bank,
2000a; IFAD, 2001]. In this respect, successful asset accumulation is often
observed to involve trading-up assets in sequence, for example, chickens to
goats to cattle to land; or, cash from non-farm income to farm inputs to higher
farm income to land or to livestock.17 It is the breadth of opportunity to
construct such asset accumulation pathways that is critical for the
achievement of rising prosperity over time. When this scope is cramped by
poorly functioning markets, a disabling public sector institutional environ-
ment or deteriorating civil security, then the ability of people to climb out of
poverty on their own initiative is severely curtailed.
Wealth-ranking exercises conducted in the 37 research villages described
here revealed many patterns in common across countries in the attributes that
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are considered by villagers themselves to deﬁne relative poverty and wealth.
Households that are considered ‘well-off’ are typically deﬁned by owning
more than 2–3 ha land, more than ﬁve goats, more than two cattle (for
pastoralist peoples, a lot more), a house with brick walls and a corrugated
iron roof. Further, they are food secure all year round, hire labour seasonally,
are educated up to primary level or higher, and engage in diverse non-farm
activities (trading, milling, shop keeping, brick making, lodgings, bars) in
addition to farming.
A middle category of households are deﬁned by owning less of most or all
these assets. Towards the lower wealth end of this category, households tend
to be net sellers rather than buyers of labour, they are seasonally food insecure
in most years, and they engage in few or no non-farm activities. Households
regarded as poor tend to have less than 0.5 ha land or do not own land at all, do
not own cattle or goats, have houses in poor repair constructed of mud and
thatch, are food insecure for much of the year, and depend on selling labour or
on safety net supports for survival. Social groups that are typically assigned to
the poor category in wealth-ranking exercises are the elderly whose families
live away from the village, divorced or widowed women, those with chronic
health problems, the disabled, and those not possessing land.
The poor as thus deﬁned by qualitative methods are a sub-set of the poor as
would be deﬁned by the consumption criterion used by economists to
measure poverty. For villagers, poverty is deﬁned mainly by reference to
attributes of social exclusion (hence, elderly, divorced, widowed, disabled),
while for the economist it is deﬁned by failure to reach a minimum
acceptable consumption level of food and basic needs.18 In the circumstances
that prevail in rural Malawi, for example, a substantially larger proportion of
rural households would be deﬁned as poor according to the economic
measure than by reference to the qualitative perceptions articulated during
wealth ranking in villages.
Distinctions of rural assets status are explored further here by reference to
household level data collected in nine districts across the four countries.
Taking land as an asset ﬁrst, Table 3 shows how mean land ownership
changes across different household income levels, divided into quartiles from
the lowest income 25 per cent up to the highest income 25 per cent of sample
households. The typical pattern, as expected, is for a steady rise in mean land
owned across the income quartiles, that is, more land is associated with
greater income; however, in the Malawi sample this effect does not kick in
until the highest income quartile.
A reason for this ﬁnding is discovered by comparing the proportion of
sample households that own land of varying amounts, across the country
samples (Table 4). In both the Uganda and Tanzania samples, most of those
with low income had little or no land. In the Malawi and Kenya samples, by
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contrast, almost everyone was found to own some land, and therefore
variations in income levels within the lower income groups are more strongly
to do with factors other than area of land owned. A notable feature shown in
Table 4 is that in all countries except Kenya, about three-quarters of sample
households owned less than 2 ha of land.
Similar ﬁndings occur with respect to livestock holdings across different
income levels, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. For this purpose, all livestock
possessed by households was aggregated into the single measure of cattle
equivalent units (CEUs). In this instance there are only minor inter-country
departures from the general trend that livestock ownership increases steadily
across the income ranges (Table 5). The trend is steepest for Tanzania and
Uganda, and is less marked, although for differing reasons, in the Malawi and
Kenya samples. Again, information on extent of ownership of different types
of livestock can help to explain variations in these ﬁndings (Table 6). In the
Tanzania and Malawi samples most households possess neither cattle nor
goats, Uganda lies in an intermediate position, and ownership of these
livestock types is most widespread in the Kenya sample.
TABLE 4
LAND OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION ACROSS SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS
Uganda Tanzania Malawi Kenya
n= 315 n= 350 n= 280 n= 350
Proportion of Sample HHs Owning % % % %
No land 23.2 22.3 2.1 1.1
Less than 0.5 ha. 41.3 33.4 11.0 19.4
Less than 2 ha. 76.9 74.0 79.9 67.7
Between 2 & 5 ha 17.7 19.4 19.4 26.9
More than 5 ha 5.4 6.6 0.7 5.4
Total: 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
TABLE 3
MEAN LAND OWNERSHIP BY INCOME QUARTILE, BY COUNTRY
Income Quartile Total
Sample I II III IV n=1295
Land owned (ha)
Uganda (n= 315) 0.59 1.05 1.96 2.15 1.43
Tanzania (n=350) 0.94 1.39 1.70 2.13 1.54
Malawi (n=280) 1.34 1.32 1.22 1.69 1.39
Kenya (n= 350) 1.43 1.81 2.02 2.16 1.86
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
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In addition to land and livestock, the key assets of rural families in the
case-study countries are their own labour (active adults in the household),
their educational attainment (measured here by years of education
accomplished), and their ownership of productive implements and tools
(measured as the aggregate value owned). The mean levels of all ﬁve of these
assets as found in the country samples are shown in Table 7.
Figure 2 takes just one of these cases, the Uganda sample, and displays the
comparative level of holdings of the ﬁve assets, or asset categories, for the
whole sample divided into per capita income terciles, in the form of a radial
graph. The interesting features revealed by this graph are, ﬁrst, that the top
and middle income thirds of households do not differ hugely in their average
possession of the ﬁve key assets; and second, that the lowest third of
households are shown to be deﬁcit particularly with respect to land, livestock
and ‘tools of the trade’ and much less so with respect to human capital, that
is, the number of working adults and their average level of education.
This basic pattern recurs across countries, although with minor variations
between them [Ellis and Mdoe, 2003; Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu, 2003].
TABLE 5
MEAN LIVESTOCK OWNERSHIP BY INCOME QUARTILE, BY COUNTRY
Income quartile Total
Sample I II III IV n= 1295
Livestock CEUs*
Uganda (n= 315) 0.77 1.92 2.01 3.15 1.96
Tanzania (n=350) 0.28 0.94 0.48 1.92 0.89
Malawi (n=280) 0.28 0.24 0.54 0.93 0.50
Kenya (n= 350) 2.85 4.31 5.16 5.95 4.57
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.*Cattle Equivalent Units (CEUs) add
up household livestock holdings by counting each head of cattle as 1 and other livestock
according to their market price level compared to cattle; for example, if goats are worth 1/6th the
value of cattle, then a goat would count as 0.17 CEU.
TABLE 6
PROPORTIONS OF SAMPLE HOUSEHOLDS LACKING LIVESTOCK ASSETS
Uganda Tanzania Malawi Kenya
n= 315 n= 350 n= 280 n= 350
Proportion of sample HHs owning % % % %
No cattle 71.1 94.8 93.2 28.3
No goats 55.6 84.6 74.3 52.6
No chickens 35.2 47.4 39.3 19.7
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
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The lower one third of the income distribution is invariably both livestock
and land poor compared to all other households, but the position with respect
to other assets is narrower and less clearcut. At the same time, the level of
livestock holdings in all cases sharply distinguishes the top income one third
of households from other households. It is interesting that education levels
reached by household members do not display these marked differences
between income groups, despite education being identiﬁed in a number of
TABLE 7
MEAN LEVEL OF SELECTED ASSETS IN COUNTRY SAMPLES
Uganda Tanzania Malawi Kenya
Asset variable Units n= 315 n= 350 n= 280 n= 350
HH Size EAAs
Land ha 1.43 1.47 1.39 1.86
Tools value 10.31 12.72 4.12 6.75
Education years 9.62 9.60 8.13 14.59
Livestock CEUs 1.96 0.89 0.50 4.57
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
FIGURE 2
SELECTED ASSETS BY INCOME TERCILE, UGANDA SAMPLE
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Source: sample survey carried out in nine villages, January to March 2001.
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studies as a critical variable explaining rural income differences [World Bank,
2000a]. It is also worth noting that in lakeside villages where ﬁshing is
combined with farming, the ownership level of ﬁshing assets was found to be
an additional factor clearly distinguishing the top income one third of
households [Allison and Mvula, 2002; Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003].
The multiple roles of livestock in contributing to successful livelihood
strategies emerge clearly from the country studies. High livestock ownership
not only denotes high wealth associated with livestock as a store of value, but
also implies high income, always placing livestock owners in the upper per
capita income ranges. Notably, however, it is not livestock itself that is the
major contributor to these higher incomes. As is shown later in this analysis,
the income composition of the top income quartile is dominated by non-farm
self-employment income in all countries. This illustrates the interlocking
nature of relative livelihood success in rural areas. Livestock is a substitutable
asset that can be sold in order to invest in land or small businesses, and vice
versa, non-farm income can be used to build up herds; the ordering of these
sequences depends on the personal and market opportunities that prevail in
different time periods.
V. RURAL ACTIVITIES AND INCOMES IN THE FOUR COUNTRIES
Starting with farming and livestock activities, data for agricultural land use
by sample households across the nine case-study villages emphasises the
dominant position of maize within farming systems in the region. The mean
proportion of maize in total land use was 44 per cent, while in Malawi this
rose to 70 per cent. Only in Uganda, where cooking bananas (matooke) are
the staple food crop in the case-study districts, does maize fall in signiﬁcance,
although, even there, maize and maize mixtures remained the largest single
land use category. Rice is also a popular crop in those places with sufﬁcient
water for its cultivation, corresponding to 12 and 14 per cent of sample land
use in Tanzania and Malawi respectively.
Qualitative research revealed signiﬁcant changes in patterns of crop
production during the ten years preceding the research, in many study
locations. A repeated ﬁnding was the decline of traditional cash crops like
coffee and cotton and the rise of new ones. For example, in the Tanzania
study sites, cotton, coffee, sunﬂower, and castor disappeared during the
1990s from villages that formerly grew them as signiﬁcant cash crops. This
was attributed by villagers to the disintegration or dissolution of the
cooperatives and parastatals that formerly supported those crops. As
sources of cash income they had been replaced by rice, playing a dual role
as food and cash crop, and also by sesame seed, tomatoes and
vegetables.19
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The overall monetisation of the agrarian economy is a feature pertinent to
poverty reduction efforts. If markets are working well, and trade and exchange
are ﬂourishing, then this increases the cash in circulation in rural areas and
gives individuals broader opportunities to construct pathways out of poverty.
Table 8 provides sample data by country on the output share of principal crops
consumed by the household rather than sold in the market. The continued
reliance within livelihood strategies on subsistence consumption for house-
hold food security is revealed. In Uganda, 73 per cent of the food staple,
matooke, is retained for home consumption. In Kenya, Tanzania and Malawi
the share of the maize harvest consumed by the household was 90, 78 and 97
per cent respectively. As will be discussed in due course, one reason for this is
a trading environment where market risk is artiﬁcially increased by multiple
taxation and rent-seeking by public agencies and ofﬁcials.
The role of subsistence in rural livelihoods is further examined by
reference to the overall share of own consumption by value in household
income across different income levels.20 The relevant data are shown in
Table 9. In general, reliance on subsistence falls steadily across the income
quartiles, the rate of this decline varying across the country samples. Thus in
Uganda, the decline is from 33 per cent to 23 per cent between the bottom
and top income quartile; while in Kenya it is from 47 per cent to 9 per cent.
Differences in the pattern of these shares between villages within each study
location suggest that relative remoteness from markets and services tends to
be associated with continued high reliance on self-provisioning, even at
TABLE 8
OUTPUT SHARE CONSUMED BY HOUSEHOLDS, SELECTED CROPS AND LIVESTOCK
Kenya Uganda Tanzania Malawi
Subsistence Share % n=350 n=315 n= 350 n= 280
Crops
Bananas – 73.2 – –
Maize 90.0 57.9 77.8 96.8
Rice – – 60.5 48.2
Millet 95.1 82.4 – –
Sorghum 89.1 – 60.1 –
Beans 81.8 65.7 59.2 79.2
Groundnuts – 68.1 – 88.0
Cassava – 87.4 59.5 –
Sweet Potatoes – 95.5 – 89.9
Irish Potatoes – 59.1 – 57.4
Livestock
Milk 75.3 50.6 - - - -
Chickens 65.6 62.9 53.2 75.3
Goats 17.5 27.2 11.9 44.4
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
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higher income levels overall. In particular, proximity to an urban area such as
a district capital both lowers this subsistence share in general, and results in
its steep decline towards the upper end of the income distribution. Richer
rural folk own businesses in nearby towns.
The composition of household total incomes provides relevant insights into
the way that asset differences result in different patterns of income earning
across income levels. Overall, in the research, it was found that household
total income divided almost equally between farm activities (crop and
livestock production) and non-farm activities (wages, self-employment and
remittances). The Tanzania sample, used here as an illustration (Table 10),
ﬁts this division exactly. The basic pattern reproduced in all country samples
is for farming to decline in importance as incomes rise while non-farm
activity rises. However, within these aggregate categories important
TABLE 9
SHARE OF SUBSISTENCE CONSUMPTION IN TOTAL INCOME, BY INCOME
QUARTILE
Income quartile
Country I II III IV Total
Uganda (n= 315) 33.4 32.6 29.4 23.2 25.9
Tanzania (n=350) 39.1 28.7 22.1 14.0 18.5
Malawi (n=280) 44.4 47.5 30.3 18.4 25.3
Kenya (n=350) 47.0 31.3 19.2 8.8 15.1
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
TABLE 10
INCOME PORTFOLIOS BY INCOME QUARTILE, TANZANIA SAMPLE
Composition of household incomes %
Income quartile
I II III IV Total
Income sources n=87 n=88 n= 88 n=81 n=344
Maize 27.1 21.5 15.1 7.9 12.4
Rice 12.3 14.2 10.3 8.8 10.0
Other crops 23.3 19.9 23.8 11.8 16.3
Livestock 5.0 7.7 6.5 14.1 11.0
Sub-total agric 67.7 63.3 55.7 42.6 49.7
Wages 14.6 8.9 9.3 11.0 10.5
Non-farm 11.5 23.7 29.3 44.0 36.1
Transfers 6.3 4.2 5.7 2.5 3.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: sample survey conducted in ten sub-villages, May–August 2001.
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subsidiary patterns are revealed. In the Tanzania case, crop income falls
across the quartiles, but livestock income rises sharply for the top income
quartile. In the non-farm category both wages and transfers fall as income
rises; while non-farm self-employment rises dramatically, from 11 per cent to
44 per cent of total income between the bottom and top income quartile.
Becoming less reliant on agriculture is part of the process of climbing out
of poverty in Tanzania, as well as elsewhere, but this is not the end of the
story. A further notable feature is that land productivity also increases steeply
with rising income, as shown for all countries in Table 11. This is measured
by mean net agricultural output per hectare in each income class, converted in
Table 11 to US$ at the exchange rates prevailing at the time the research was
conducted.21 This ﬁnding reinforces the cumulative nature of becoming better
off in rural areas of the case-study countries, a process that has been identiﬁed
by many other researchers.22 The direction of causality is that non-farm
income enables the household to hire labour to undertake timely cultivation
practices, and helps to fund the purchase of farm cash inputs; conversely,
hiring out labour by poor households causes their own farm productivity to
stagnate or fall. Livestock ownership plays a reinforcing role in virtuous
spirals of accumulation, just as its absence contributes to the inability of
poorer households to climb onto the ﬁrst rung of the ‘ladder’ leading out of
poverty.
VI . INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL POVERTY REDUCTION
The term institutions is used here to describe customs, rules, regulations,
laws, public agencies, and the way these habitually, and from precedence, go
about doing what they do. Institutions as so deﬁned change much more
slowly than the structures in which they are contained [North, 1990]. The
creation of structures ushering in democratic decentralisation does not in
practice quickly change habitual relationships between public ofﬁcials and
rural citizens [Crook and Manor, 1998].
TABLE 11
NET AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT PER HA, BY INCOME QUARTILE (US$/HA)
Income quartile Ratio
Country I II III IV IV:I
Uganda 131 215 295 487 3.7
Tanzania 81 108 156 381 4.7
Malawi 18 44 84 109 6.0
Kenya 135 266 358 430 3.2
Source: sample surveys carried out in 37 villages, 2001–02.
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Qualitative research conducted in 37 villages provided a number of useful
insights into the institutional context within which individuals and house-
holds attempt to construct viable livelihood strategies. Some key points that
emerged are as follows:
(a) The past decade has seen a multiplication of community-based
organisations (CBOs) in rural communities, some instigated by NGOs,
others responding to new pressures that reciprocal help between
community members can help to alleviate. The most prevalent groups
are burial groups (present nowadays in most villages), women’s
groups, and credit groups created for particular purposes. Many of
these groups take the form of rotating savings and credit associations
(ROSCAs) whereby members pay in an agreed regular contribution and
take it in turns to utilise the collected fund of the group.
(b) Villages across the case-study countries generally seem to have
beneﬁcial experiences with direct assistance that they receive from
NGOs; indeed often major differences have been made in people’s
lives by provision of piped water, wells, latrines, agricultural extension
advice, input supplies, food-for-work schemes, microcredit schemes,
and formation of village groups with speciﬁed development objectives.
International NGOs such as Oxfam, CARE, ActionAid, and Concern
Universal are most frequently encountered as providing support of
these kinds, although more specialist NGOs that focus on one thing like
upgrading dairy cattle also feature. As always with NGOs, issues of
haphazard coverage, failure to scale up, and sustainability of what is
accomplished after project completion are weaknesses [ODI, 1996].
Nevertheless, it is plain that more useful things are accomplished and
left behind to the future beneﬁt of village citizens by NGOs, than by
governments. In some instances, for example agricultural advice, the
collapse of government delivery over the past ten years means that it is
often only NGOs that have provided this type of service to villages.
(c) Market liberalisation has had variable effects, and it is difﬁcult at this
stage to reach ﬁrm conclusions as to its net long run impact on rural
livelihoods.23 Farm sales prices are now unstable, whereas under crop
boards and parastatals they were set and predictable; on the other hand,
farmers often failed to get paid under the former arrangements, or ﬁxed
prices were lower than their market equivalents. Fertiliser prices seem
to have risen in real terms everywhere resulting in less use of purchased
farm inputs than in the past [Kherallah et al., 2000]. The effectiveness
of private trading is variable; remote locations are often poorly served,
and perceptions of weights-and-measures ‘cheating’ by traders are
widespread. The introduction of user fees for health and education is
POVERTY REDUCTION IN FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES 19
deeply resented, not so much due to the fees themselves, but to the low,
and sometimes deteriorating, quality of service provided. On the other
hand, in some instances, liberalisation has substantially improved the
scope of individuals to construct diverse livelihood strategies involving
non-farm activities [for Tanzania, see Booth et al., 1993; Bagachwa,
1997].
(d) Land rights and ownership are a signiﬁcant institutional policy issue
throughout the region [Cross, 2003]. While customary tenure still
prevails in most locations, this is often giving way in a haphazard way
to de facto private ownership. In some places, tenancy is a particular
problem, especially regarding rights of tenants and security of tenure
(for example, some parts of Uganda). New land legislation passed in
several of the countries over the past ﬁve years tends to be timid,
opening the door to private ownership just enough to beneﬁt
entrepreneurs intent on aggregating land for commercial purposes,
while seeking at the same time to preserve state or customary
ownership and the patterns of patronage associated with its allocation.
The right of women to own land independently of men is not provided
in recent legislation. A distinct set of policy questions are posed by land
sub-division at inheritance which is resulting in the multiplication of
sub-optimal farm sizes in high population density locations, so that
only a proportion of the next generation in such places will have access
to an amount of land that makes farming viable as the primary source
of livelihood.
(e) Experiences and views of public services and ofﬁcialdom tend to be
mixed or negative across all countries and locations. A number of
reasons are commonly cited for this. Public education and health
services are seen to have deteriorated in quality despite charges being
levied for access to them. Not a single one of the 37 research villages
had been visited by a public agricultural extension ofﬁcer in the
previous ten years, according to group discussions. Rural citizens pay a
wide variety of different taxes and levies in the course of trying to make
a living (on which more below), but rarely experience any improvement
in services that can be connected to those taxes. Elected public
representatives such as MPs and ward councillors are often placed by
villagers at the very bottom of their ranking of useful institutions.
The qualitative research suggests that the institutional environment facing
rural citizens in the different countries rarely actively fosters the ﬂourishing
of diverse activities that are required in order to achieve rapid poverty
reduction in rural areas. The norm tends to be in an opposing direction; with
access to enterprise and opportunity being discouraged or blocked by formal
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and informal gatekeepers including ‘gratiﬁcations’ to traditional leaders,
onerous licensing requirements, multiple taxes on crops and livestock, ofﬁcial
and unofﬁcial roadblocks and so on. A small minority of individuals with the
requisite personal networks and contacts in the local or national public sector
are able to avoid or rise above the legal or informal restrictions with which
most rural citizens must comply.
VII . RURAL TAXATION
Rural taxation is selected as a policy issue to consider further here because the
tax raising powers granted to local councils under decentralisation potentially
create conﬂicts with poverty reduction goals. The underlying premises are
understood (i) that elected district councils need budgets to deliver local
services, and (ii) that a proportion of these budgets should be locally raised so
that a connection is made in the minds of taxpayers between council
performance in the delivery of services and taxes paid.24 On the other hand,
tax collection methods and levels need also to consider the severity of their
incidence on the rural poor, the disincentive effects that they may have on
enterprise and exchange in the rural economy, and the effect that they have on
the broader relations between government and governed [Fjeldstad, 2001a;
2002]
All four research countries possess rural taxation systems that pre-date
current moves towards ﬁscal decentralisation, indeed many tax types can be
traced back to rural revenue raising in colonial times. Prior to contemporary
decentralisation processes, these taxes were mainly collected by local
administrations on behalf of central government (for example, poll taxes), by
district level branches of central departments (for example, ﬁsheries taxes), or
by parastatal authorities (for example, crop cesses, movement permits). As
demonstrated for Tanzania by Fjeldstad [2001b] and Fjeldstad and Semboja
[2000], even without full tax raising powers being granted to elected local
governments, these taxes have tended to be multiple, complicated, pervasive,
bear no relation to service delivery, create numerous rent seeking
opportunities, and accentuate relations of mistrust and subordination between
ordinary citizens and those who possess these revenue generating powers
over them.
Rural taxation in Uganda is described brieﬂy here as an illustration of the
conﬂict that can arise between poverty reduction strategies, on the one hand,
and local revenue generation, on the other. Uganda happens to have gone
furthest amongst the case-study countries in implementing democratic
decentralisation, and in granting taxation and licensing powers to district
councils. However, the problems described here for Uganda are widely
prevalent in the countries of the region irrespective of the stage they have
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reached in implementing decentralisation.25 The real question raised by the
Uganda example is not whether one country has a better or worse current
record with respect to the policy contradictions of local taxation, but whether
decentralisation creates signals and pressures that are likely to diminish rather
than exacerbate such contradictions in the future.
Rural Ugandans pay an immense array of taxes [Ellis and Bahiigwa,
2003]. There is a graduated personal tax (GPT) payable annually by all
adult males which, since 2001, has been pegged at a ﬂat rate of UShs 3,000
per person.26 In addition there are business licence fees, sales taxes,
markets taxes, transit taxes, taxes particular to livestock movement and
taxes particular to ﬁshing as an occupation. In one district visited in early
2003, the district revenue ofﬁce set 136 separate ﬂat rate market dues, 81
separate ﬂat rate business licences, and, in theory at least, there were 22
different graduated tax bands.27 These taxes are variable in their incidence
on individual transactions, and directly and indirectly on rural incomes.
They also tend to be regressive in character, the tax incidence being higher
on small rather than large transaction types (Table 12), and on small rather
than large enterprises.28
Various difﬁculties for rural poverty reduction arise from the tax regime
observed in rural Uganda. These difﬁculties have been emphasised in a
qualitative way in two successive rounds of the Uganda Participatory
Poverty Assessment Process (known as UPPAP1 and UPPAP2) [Muhumuza
and Ehrhart, 2000; Uganda, 2002]. A ﬂat rate income or poll tax is
observably regressive to ordinary taxpayers and to those lacking cash
resources in particular, variable rate market taxes distort relative prices and
reduce economic efﬁciency and growth, variable rate business licences
distort enterprise start-up decisions and discourage investment, the
pervasiveness of transaction taxes reinforces a subsistence orientation in
TABLE 12
SELECTED FLAT RATE MARKET DUES AS A PERCENTAGE OF FARM GATE PRICES;
KAMULI DISTRICT, UGANDA, MARCH 2003
Transaction type
Commodity Small (poor) Large (better off)
Crops Millet (tin) 8% Millet (bag) 2%
Sweet potato (tin) 30% Sweet Potato (bag) 10%
Maize (tin) 5% Maize (bag) 4%
Bananas (bunch) 15% Bananas (bunch) 15%
Livestock Goat 4% Cow 3.5%
Milk 5 litres 10% 10 litres 5%
Fish 1 Tilapia 50% Bundle Tilapia 30%
Source: Kamuli District Revenue Ofﬁce, March 2003.
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rural production, and, overall, cash generation and monetisation in the rural
economy is discouraged (Table 12).
The methods used for tax collection also raise issues for poverty policy in
Uganda. Many Ugandan rural districts have adopted a private tendering
system for the collection of different types of taxes. This could, potentially,
be a successful idea, depending on how it is implemented, since private
collection may result in lower costs and more effective revenue collection
than utilising local government employees for the same purpose [Kiser and
Baker, 1994; Livingstone and Charlton, 2001]. Taxation literature recog-
nises, however, that overzealous collection can occur under privatised tax
collection systems [Stella, 1993]. Under the tendering system, private
individuals tender to the district council to collect taxes in speciﬁed market
places, ﬁsh landing sites, or parishes. A reserve level of taxation receipts for
those locations is ﬁrst ﬁxed by the council based on estimated levels of
taxable transactions occurring at them. There is much potential for
malfeasance in this system: collusion between members of the tender board
and tax collectors, collection of unreceipted taxes, or differences between
coupon and actual taxes paid. Two tax contracts followed up in detail during
ﬁeld research revealed a substantial gap between revenues collected and
revenue delivered: in one example an estimated UShs 300,000 was collected
compared to a delivery contract of UShs 30,000 per month [James, Francis
and Pereza, 2001]; in another UShs 200,000 was collected compared to a
delivery contract of UShs 40,000 per month.29
VII I . SYNTHESIS AND POLICY INFERENCES
This paper set out to make the links between macro level endeavours to
develop a comprehensive approach to poverty reduction in Uganda, Kenya,
Tanzania and Malawi and a micro level understanding of the circumstances
and prospects of the rural poor. At the macro level, approaches to poverty
reduction are set out in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or equivalent
documents written between 1999 and 2001, and the question that needs to be
posed is whether these documents formulate the poverty reduction problem in
a way that addresses the real barriers that rural citizens confront in their
efforts to construct pathways out of poverty. At the micro level, the
sustainable livelihoods framework is utilised to gain a more accurate picture
of the asset and activity patterns that characterise the poor in particular, and
the institutional context that either blocks or enables rural citizens in their
pursuit of more secure livelihoods over time.
In this context, decentralisation interposes itself between rural livelihoods
and PRSPs because it is decentralised institutions that become responsible for
implementing PRSP goals at district level and below, and the same
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institutions constitute the interface between the public realm and the citizen
at local levels. Except in the case of economic variables that transmit
themselves widely across national space (prices, interest rates, exchange
rates), macro–micro links are ﬁltered through the functions and behaviours of
decentralised institutions. The critical consideration raised by this paper is the
degree to which it is safe from a poverty reduction perspective to grant local
councils wide ranging legislative, taxation and licensing powers independent
of national poverty reduction priorities. The advocacy of such powers is
based, certainly on the part of donors, on an idealised projection of
democratic processes in communities enforcing good governance and
effective service delivery by public agents at local levels. However, when
these ideal conditions fail to materialise, decentralised government can
become part of the problem of rural poverty, not part of the solution.
PRSPs are typically competent at identifying large scale factors that are
viewed by rural citizens everywhere as constraints on their ability to improve
their circumstances. These factors include poor schools, health services and
rural roads, as well as unevenly working markets, lack of credit, and high
costs of farm inputs. Some of these factors, principally schools, clinics and
roads are amenable to improvement through budget support by donors and
conditional grants to district councils allocated under strict governance and
accounting procedures. Others are less susceptible or cannot be addressed at
all by such an approach, and PRSPs are able to do little more than make
hopeful statements of intent with respect to them.
A particularly unresolved policy arena is that surrounding the future
delivery of agricultural and livestock services to farmers and herders
[Omamo, 2003]. Uganda is making bold moves to break out of previous
orthodoxies regarding the provision of these services, and the approaches that
emerge there will be worth following closely.30 A related challenge is making
output markets work for the rural poor in a liberalised market environment.
Institutional innovations such as contracting and out-grower schemes can
work for commercial or high value crops but not for low value food crops
grown by the majority of resource poor farmers [Delgado, 1999]. Innovative
public–private partnerships based on collective action by farmers and
effective rural collection points hold some promise for these types of farmers
[Freeman and Silim, 2002].
The research described in this paper emphasises features of rural poverty
that are commonplace throughout the region. These features include small
and declining farm sizes, lack of livestock as a substitutable asset, prevalence
even in normal years of food deﬁcit from own production, low monetisation
of the local economy, and consequently little cash in circulation to act as a
stimulus to multiplying rural activities. In addition, in some locations,
deteriorating civil security in villages adds to the difﬁculties of improving
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household asset status. Moreover, individuals and households confront
numerous institutional gatekeepers and blockages that paralyse all but the
most energetic from taking additional risks or exploring new avenues for
gaining a viable livelihood. These blockages reside primarily in the way
district level licensing and taxation systems work, although they can also be
associated with traditional authority systems at sub-district level, and with
‘invisible’ levies and tithes and permissions that are haphazard in their
incidence, and variable in the discouragement they represent.
At the level of the family or household, securing better living standards is a
cumulative process that requires an ability to build assets and diversify across
farm and non-farm activities. In this process, cash generation is critical, since
it confers the capability to invest either in improved farm practices or in non-
farm assets, or some combination of both, according to the options that arise
to reduce risk and increase income generation. Multiple commodity and
enterprise taxes levied at village level suppress cash generation at the very
point where it can make the most difference to the livelihoods of the poor.
More than this, the uneven, haphazard and sometimes dishonest levying of
such taxes that tends to be observed in different rural settings adds to risk, and
further inhibits the multiplication of economic activities in rural areas.
In the light of the micro evidence, therefore, the creation of a facilitating
environment that encourages the ﬂourishing of diverse monetised rural
activities should be the centrepiece of rural poverty reduction thinking. It is,
of course, possible to devise technical alternatives to inefﬁcient, ineffective
and inequitable local taxation regimes. Some alternatives worth considering
are property (land and building) taxes rather than poll and commodity taxes;
simpliﬁcation, so that a multiplicity of poorly designed taxes are replaced by
a few, transparent, ones; and more use of tax and licence thresholds so that
poor individuals and small or start-up businesses are excluded from the tax
net altogether.
However, as emphasised by Fjeldstad [2001b], resistance to reform arises
from those individuals and groups who beneﬁt from current regimes and who
would be disadvantaged by the alternatives. Demonstrating the ﬂaws in
current practice is not enough. Reform requires building coalitions for
change, starting at central government level, since the parameters of
legitimate types and scales of local taxation are usually determined in
central legislation (local government reform acts) before being interpreted
within those parameters by local councils. It might be more appropriate for
donors to contribute to building some political momentum for a change of
thinking in this area than to continue naively, as currently, to ‘capacity build’
local councils to extract more tax. The appropriate place for doing this lies in
the donor–government processes surrounding the evolution of PRSPs; it is
after all here that the intention is so frequently articulated to create the
POVERTY REDUCTION IN FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES 25
enabling conditions under which the rural poor can devise their own routes
out of poverty.
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NOTES
1. The research programme is entitled LADDER, standing for Livelihoods and Diversiﬁcation
Directions Explored by Research, an acronym devised to evoke the notion of ‘climbing out
of poverty’. The programme is funded principally by the Policy Research Programme of the
UK Department for International Development (DFID), with a contribution to work in Kenya
made by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The ﬁndings and views
expressed here are solely the responsibility of the authors and are not attributable to DFID or
UNDP. This cross-country overview draws on and synthesises material published in
individual country papers [Ellis and Bahiigwa, 2003; Ellis and Mdoe, 2003; Ellis, Kutengule
and Nyasulu; 2003; Freeman, Ellis and Allison, 2004].
2. The sustainable livelihoods framework can be represented in a variety of ways, but typically
comprises the interacting components of assets, activities, vulnerability context, institutional
context, and outcomes [Carney, 1998; Scoones, 1998; Ellis, 2000: Ch.1].
3. The World Bank deﬁnes PRSPs as follows: ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP)
describe a country’s macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs to promote
growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external ﬁnancing needs. PRSPs are
prepared by governments through a participatory process involving civil society and
development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’. This
as well as other details of the PRSP approach can be found on the World Bank website at:
http://www.worldbank.org/ poverty/strategies.
4. See Norton and Foster [2000] for a useful discussion of the links between livelihoods
approaches and PRSPs.
5. The similarities in rural livelihood circumstances found across these four countries as
detailed later in this paper is in itself an interesting ﬁnding of the research, given their
disparate political and economic strategy histories post-independence.
6. The independence dates of the four countries were Tanzania [1961], Uganda [1962], Kenya
[1963], Malawi [1964].
7. The original East African Community lasted from 1967 to 1977, but with decreasing
effectiveness through that period. The Community was re-established by the heads of state of
the three countries in November 1999.
8. A national referendum was held in Uganda in 2000 to determine whether to move to multi-
party politics, and this option was rejected by the majority of voters.
9. These are brief generalisations, and there exists, of course, an enormous literature on the
post-independence politics and economics of each of these four countries.
10. For perceptive accounts of politics and the state in post-colonial African countries see
Sandbrook [1986; 2000]. See also Cross and Kutengule [2001]. The decline in real public
sector salaries is detailed in Jamal and Weeks [1993].
11. The proportion of the population deﬁned as rural is notoriously sensitive to the cut-off point
at which larger settlements are treated as urban areas, so these inter-country differences may
be somewhat artiﬁcial.
12. Available income distribution estimates are rather fragmentary, but Kenya had an estimated
Gini coefﬁcient of 0.445 in 1994 compared to Uganda (0.374 in 1996) and Tanzania (0.382
in 1993) [World Bank, 2002c]. In one World Bank source Malawi is cited as exhibiting a
Gini coefﬁcient of 0.620 [World Bank, 1998].
13. The ﬁrst draft of Uganda’s PEAP was published in 1997; Tanzania’s National Poverty
Eradication Strategy (NPES) in 1998 [Tanzania, 1998]; Malawi’s Poverty Action Plan (PAP)
in 1997.
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14. A useful account of PRSP background and processes is provided in Warnock [2002]. For the
PRSPs of the four countries see Tanzania [2000], Uganda [2001], Malawi [2001], Kenya
[2001].
15. Debt relief under HIPC has a number of sequential stages, involving, inter alia, endorsement
of the PRSP by the IMF and World Bank (decision point) and evidence of one year’s
successful implementation before the agreed amount of debt is cancelled (completion point).
Kenya has so far engaged minimally in the HIPC process in part due to having a per capita
income that places it just above the ceiling range of the priority HIPC countries, but possibly
more relevantly due to policy lapses as viewed by donors [see World Bank, 2000b].
16. This section draws on similar descriptions contained in the separate country studies [Ellis
and Bahiigwa, 2003; Ellis and Mdoe, 2003; Ellis, Kutengule and Nyasulu, 2003; Freeman,
Ellis and Allison, 2004].
17. This sequencing of asset accumulation mirrors the sequencing of asset disposal that occurs in
crises such as famines, and can result in the deterioration of the asset position of families to
the point that they are no longer able to construct a viable livelihood [Corbett, 1988;
Devereux, 1993].
18. The economic deﬁnition of the poverty line is the level of per capita consumption that just
permits the individual to satisfy basic nutritional requirements expressed in calories, given
the measured share of food in the per capita expenditure of the poor [see, for example, Lipton
and Ravallion, 1995].
19. The longer term impact of these changes on rural incomes depends on factors that fell outside
the scope of this research. These include world price trends of the traditional export
commodities replaced by new cash crops, exchange rates, and the character of private trading
systems that replaced former parastatal marketing bodies.
20. For this purpose, subsistence consumption of crops and livestock products is valued at the
average farm gate prices cited in the completed household survey forms.
21. Net agricultural output refers to gross output (quantities produced multiplied by farm gate
sales prices) minus purchased inputs into the production process, where hired labour is
treated as a purchased input, but family labour is not costed in the calculation. The exchange
rates prevailing at the time of the research in each country were (local currency per US$):
Uganda (1772.5 Ushs), Kenya (78.93 Kshs), Tanzania (890.18 Tshs), Malawi (68.12 Mk).
22. For example, World Bank [2000a], IFAD [2001] and Barrett et al., [2001], publications that
themselves draw on considerable bodies of poverty research. For similar ﬁndings on rising
farm productivity across income levels see Evans and Ngau [1991].
23. Liberalisation is often debated as if it were a fait accompli and all that were now required is
strengthening of private trading systems; however the reality is much more complex than this
with rural areas of the four countries being littered with semi-moribund remnants of state
organisations some of which have powerful effects in restricting the space within which
private operators can manoeuvre [Cooksey, 2003].
24. The link between taxation and public service delivery has been argued to constitute a
cornerstone of the relationship between government and governed in democratic societies
[Moore, 1998; Moore and Rakner, 2002].
25. In addition to items by Fjeldstad, already cited in the text, see James, Mdoe and Mishili
[2002] and Ellis and Mdoe [2003] for Tanzania; and Freeman, Ellis and Allison [2004] on
Kenya.
26. The graduated personal tax was previously applied at a minimum rate of UShs 11,000 (the
gradations above this that legislation makes provision for are seldom, if ever, applied);
however, at the time of national elections in 2001, the tax was rebated by presidential decree
to the ﬂat rate UShs 3,000 level.
27. The district that this data refers to is Kamuli district and the effective tax rates were those
prevailing in March 2003.
28. For example, in Kamuli district in 2003, the licence fee for a hawker was UShs 12,000, the
same as a radio repairer, a tailor or a hairdresser; that for a shoemaker was UShs 20,000 as
compared to UShs 100,000 for a petrol station.
29. The private tax tendering system, as other aspects of rural taxation in rural Uganda, is the
subject of ongoing research at the time of writing in mid-2003.
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30. The principles and design of the Uganda approach are set out in a government document
produced in October 2000 [Uganda, 2000b].
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